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Abstract. For risk management, the results of a probabilistic 
risk analysis (PRA) as well as the underlying assumptions can 
be used as references in a closed-loop risk control; and the 
analyses of operational experiences as a means of feedback. In 
this context, the need for explicit definition and documen-
tation of the PRA coverage, including the search strategies 
applied, is discussed and aids are proposed such as plant 
description in terms of a formal abstraction hierarchy and use 
of cause-consequence-charts for the documentation of not only 
the results of PRA but also of its coverage. Typical human risk 
contributions are described on the basis of general plant 
design features relevant for risk and accident analysis. 
With this background, search strategies for human risk con-
tributions are treated: Under the designation "work analysis", 
procedures for the analysis of familiar, well trained, planned 
tasks are proposed. Strategies for identifying human risk 
contributions outside this category are outlined. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before turning to the »ore specific topic of this report, a 
frame-work for the development of formalized search strategies 
for human risk contributions, we find it practical to describe 
that concept of Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) into which 
the search strategies should be fitted. The following aspects 
of this background will be discussed in more detail: 
- relationships between PRA and Risk Management 
- analysability as reflected in nuclear plant design 
- typical categories of human risk contributions. 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRA AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Fig. 1 illustrates how the risk imposed by an industrial 
process plant, for instance nuclear power plant, is controlled 
in two ways: Firstly, by a plant construction based on a risk 
analysis. Secondly, by Risk Management (RM), i.e., adminis-
tration of the preconditions of the risk analysis which act as 
requirements for plant construction and operation. In addition, 
through the plant lifetime, the preconditions for risk analysis 
can serve as references for inspections, tests and analyses of 
operational experience. Decisions made from systematic analysis 
of abnormal event reports can lead to risk management by means 
of a "feed-back" control function serving to maintain the 
designer's safety design targets and to reveal oversights and 
design errors. 
The result of a PRA is a calculated risk figure which, if 
accepted, covers the "accepted risk". If not accepted, the 
design has to be modified until acceptance has been achieved. 
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Fig. 1. The risk contributed by the operation of an industrial 
plant is composed of an accepted risk identified and analysed in 
advance and a risk due to incomplete analysis and insufficient 
regard to preconditions for the risk analysis. The latter risk 
is to be controlled by risk management functions comprising 
quality control, functional tests, inspection, training and in-
struction of personnel and including analysis of operational ex-
perience as a feedback link. Adopted from Rasmussen, 1982. 
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Due to incompleteness and errors during performance of PRA, 
however, an "additional risk" may exist, which is not included 
in the accepted risk. Contributions to this additional risk can 
also originate from the fact that the real plant and its 
operation may depart from the PRA preconditions, e.g. 
- because components employed do not belong to the populations 
providing the PRA failure data 
- because the real plant does not correspond with the models of 
the plant used for PRA 
- because the real plant is not operated and maintained 
according to assumptions made in the PRA. 
After the calculated risk has been accepted, the PRA assump-
tions, models and data sources are to be used as requirements 
and references for construction, modification and operation 
during the lifetime of the plant, i.e., as references for the 
risk management (RM) functions. 
Some important means for control in RM in order to make sure 
that the plant is kept in agreement with these references are 
- quality control 
- functional tests and inspections 
- training of operator«? 
- issuing instructions for operation etc. 
In order to close the loop from theory to practice, i.e., from 
the PRA to the plant in existence, RM should comprise analysis 
and evaluation of failures and abnormal occurrences by compari-
son with the references provided by the PRA for deciding 
whether the abnormalities are included in the accepted risk or 
whether they indicate circumstances overlooked in the PRA or 
flaws in risk administration requiring adjustments of practice. 
The use of the PRA, including its preconditions as references 
for RM, obviously requires explicit and user-oriented documen-
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tation of the PRA, including preconditions, models and data 
sources. Particularly, documentation of the coverage of the 
analysis and search methods, i.e., what has been included in 
the search for risk contributions, is important for evaluating 
operating experience as a basis for RN decisions in the 
feedback control. The well documented model and description of 
the risk identification strategies of the PRA are necessary to 
decide whether an individual occurrence falls within the 
accepted risk and, therefore, should contribute to statistical 
verification or whether it indicates oversights or operational 
problems which call for special precautions. In this respect, 
documentation of coverage is considered more important than 
attempts to reach high degrees of completeness depending upon 
the individual creativity of an analyst and, therefore, suscep-
tible to problems with undefined boundaries. 
The major part of the human decision making and administrative 
functions involved in operations management is not accessible 
to formal analyses with the present state of the PRA art. 
Errors of management may, however, be significant sources of 
common mode errors and, therefore, are important candidates for 
risk management by feed-back control. This feed-back control 
should not only depend on the formal analysis of abnormal event 
reports by authorities, but also on the systematic in-house 
analysis of log-books, repair reports and similar sources by 
the plant staff itself. 
ANALYSABILITY AS REFLECTED IN PLANT DESIGN 
The possibility of accomplishing a credible PRA is supported by 
particular main design features affecting plant structure and 
utilizing properties of plant processes in such a way that, 
viewed from the PRA side, the propagation structure of acci-
dents has limited variability. This means that relevant acci-
dent sequences can be ordered and studied collectively in a 
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fair number of classes. In addition, the accident propagation 
is subdivided into several subsequent phases by several inde-
pendent counter-measures, based on different physical prin-
ciples. This "defense-in-depth" design philosophy makes it 
possible in a realistic way to achieve very low probability of 
an accident with moderate requirements to the failure prob-
abilities of each phase under the condition of independence of 
the different counter-measures. Therefore, the failure prob-
ability of the individual phases can be verified empirically, 
even though this is not the case for the overall risk 
probability directly. 
Additional important ingredients of this design philosophy can 
be recognized: 
- major risk is related to loss of control of well defined 
energy and material/mass balances. This implies a transport 
or integration ("pile up") delay which makes early warnings 
and protective actions possible. This protection is an active 
defense against accidental chains of events irrespectively of 
the initial causes. 
- the probability of loss of control is, therefore, determined 
by the frequency of the typical causes together with the 
reliability of the protective functions, i.e. this category 
of accidental chains is accessible to quantification due to 
the feedback effect of the protective functions. As is the 
case of feed-back loops in general, the overall properties 
are largely determined by the properties of the feed-back 
path. 
By elaborating on the generalized accident structure presented 
above and shown in figure 2, we will discuss in some detail 
typical human risk contributions. 
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Fig. 2. In nuclear power plants like other industi'ial processes, 
major accidents have a common structure of propagation due to 
the design philosophy applied. Adopted from Rasmussen, 1982. 
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TYPICAL HUMAN RISK CONTRIBUTIONS 
With reference to the generalised sequence, typical categories 
of human contributions can be identified. 
As causes of accidental chains of events, the staple human 
Trors are generally not very significant for the result of a 
PRA, because: 
- their effects are typically equivalent to technical component 
failures in the system the human operates. 
- their frequencies will not significantly change the overall 
result based on component data, considering the uncertainty 
of such data; - or their effects are included in the data on 
component fault rates. 
- human errors performed on active systems are often im-
mediately recognised and corrected. 
Special consideration must instead be given the categories of 
human errors which influence the generic structure of the 
accident, such as: 
- human acts which cause couplings between different phases of 
Fig. 2. For instance human acts which at the same time 
initiate a transient and disturb the protective functions. 
- errors in the design of protective systems which affect the 
capability of the protective system to handle a subset of 
transients. In this category one can also consider errors in 
work planning and scheduling related to maintenance and 
refuelling periods. 
In all systems based on feedback design principles, the 
performance is very sensitive to disturbance of the feedback 
path. For PRA this means that human interaction with the safety 
« 
functions is a key proble«. Several analytical problems can be 
identified: 
- Estimation of the reliability of protective functions allo-
cated human operators. Since such functions are required 
under possibly stressing conditions, a meaningful quantitat-
ive reliability estimation can only be made under special 
assumptions regarding interface design and training. 
- Estimation of the probability that operators due to misunder-
standing or conflicting requirement during emergencies will 
interfere with the operation of automatic safety functions. 
Such interference can be caused systematically by high 
similarity among elements of different tasks or procedures or 
because the same equipment may be used for different purposes 
and, therefore, appear in different situations. 
- Influence of human reliability on the maintenance, test and 
calibration of protective systems. Problems are in particular 
related to systems with extreme technical reliability speci-
fications, such as redunuant systems for which complex 
situations during work planning and maintenance may give rise 
to "common mode" errors. 
FORMALIZED SEARCH STRATEGIES FOR HUMAN RISK CONTRIBUTIONS 
Within the context discussed so far, we will consider a 
framework for a systematic, procedural ized strategy for identi-
fication of the potential for such human interactions with the 
performance of a technical system, which will significantly 
contribute to the overall risk and, therefore, must be rep-
resented in a risk assessment and risk management system. 
Several important features must be required for such a pro-
cedural i zed strategy: 
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A) It must refer to an overall probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA) possessing a boundary of the set of accident mechan-
isms covered which can be explicitly stated; i.e., the 
degree of completeness of the search procedure can be 
explicitly stated conceptually and the structure within 
which the uearch is performed can be documented. To form an 
acceptable reference for risk management, a known degree of 
completeness is more important than a high, but undetermined 
degree. In the approach taken here, we base the PRA on a 
cause-consequence-analysis which is performed by a system-
atic search for disturbances of vital material and energy 
balances. To be systematic, this analysis must cover the 
system as specified by the plant documentation including for 
instance piping and instrumentation diagrams and formal 
operating procedures. The analysis will be systematically 
documented by graphical cause-consequence-charts (CCCs). 
This analysis will consider as an integrated part only the 
human influences in terms of the reliability and immediate 
risk of those activities which are contained in the formal-
ized and instructed operator tasks; i.e., it includes a 
work analysis for such activities. Therefore, the PRA must 
also be supplemented with a separate analysis of the 
potential for human factors interference from activities and 
decisions which are not represented in the formal work 
procedures. 
B) This analysis for additional human factors interference must 
likewise be based on a search strategy which can be 
explicitly specified with reference to the initial PRA. In 
this respect we will consider search for human interference 
which may: 1. Affect the frequency of chains of events in 
the CCC; 2. Change the structure of the CCC by breaking the 
recovery paths representing safety functions; or 3. Intro-
duce couplings among otherwise independent events. 
C) Effective risk management means use of analysis of event and 
incident reports for a feed-back control of risk potential 
outside the coverage of the analytical risk assessment. This 
in theory gives a way of securing completeness of risk 
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control. The underlying assumption, however, will be that 
accidents due to chains of events outside the risk analysis 
depend on stochastic coincidence of several events which can 
be identified and controlled individually by means of event 
and incident analysis, as discussed in the previous section. 
This assumption appears to be realistic due to the defense 
in depth philosophy, but must be studied carefully. 
In the following paragraphs we will discuss the elements of 
this approach in more detail and sketch a first attempt to 
procedural ize the search. 
THE BASIC P.R.A. 
The development of a procedural i zed PRA based on CCC will be 
described independently of the present work and published 
separately. However, a brief discussion of the underlying 
framework will serve to define the interface to the human 
factors analysis. The structure of a CCC and a heuristic 
strategy to develop the charts are discussed elsewhere (Nielsen 
1974). Briefly, a cause-consequei.ce-chart is a graphic rep-
resentation of a family of accidental chains of events which 
has a "critical event" in common, see Fig. 3. 
The critical event in a CCC is the focal point connecting an 
up-stream tree of causal chains of events with a down-stream 
tree representing the various relevant consequences. A cause-
-consequence analysis will in general imply a set of CCCs based 
on various critical events. The size of this set and the 
possibility for explicit definition of the boundaries of 
coverage depends very much on the strategy for the selection of 
the set of critical events to be applied for the analysis. 
Therefore, a set of formal rules must be developed to choose a 
consistent set of critical events. 
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3. The structure of a cause-consequence chart for a criti-
event in a process system. From Nielsen (1974). 
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Furthermore, a set of principles to guide the path tracing 
identifying the causal propagation through the system must be 
formulated for the development of the individual CCCs. As it 
has been previously argued (Rasmussen, 1982) the documentation 
of the search strategies behind a risk analysis is a very 
important part of the result of the assessment. A fault-tree is 
only a logical combinatorial record of the result of an 
analysis; a CCC in addition records the causal chains consider-
ed; but neither of them represents the identification procedure 
applied. 
The present approach depends on the conception of an accident 
as a loss of control with accumulated material or/and energy in 
a system (Rasmussen, 1982) and upon a systematic use of a 
description of the system in terms of a formal abstraction 
hierarchy (Rasmussen, 1979a; Rasmussen & Lind, 1982), see Fig. 
4. 
The strategy for development of CCCs will be a top-down search 
for disturbances in this hierarchy. The critical events are 
typically chosen at the level of "abstract function" in terms 
of the identification of those material and energy accumu-
lations which have potential for unacceptable consequences at 
the "purpose level", i.e., for plant availability and safety, 
judged alone by magnitude and content of accumulations, and not 
at this stage by probability of mechanisms of release. 
At the next lower level of "generalized functions", the func-
tions which are intended for control of the accumulations - in 
tha considered operational mode and during emergencies - are 
identified. These are then the generic functions which should 
be analysed further for sensitivity to disturbances. The 
consideration at this general level of functions involved in 
control of mass and energy accumulations is important since 
there seems in this way to be a possibility for the systematic 
analysis of the problem of "system interactions" (which has 
been identified as a major safety problem, cf. USNRC 1980-1981. 
A potential source for such interaction of a non-random nature 
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Fig. 4. The abstraction hierarchy used for representation 
functional properties of a technical system. 
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is related to the fact that the same general functions can be 
served by different physical systems and parts which in 
addition may serve various other functions. See figure 5 and 6. 
This lack of one-to-one correspondence between functions and 
systems requires a stringent analysis involving both levels of 
descriptions in order to identify the potential for systematic 
"functions-interference" during certain situations. 
From the generalized functions, the implementation in terms of 
the physical function of related equipment is identified and 
the bottom-up propagation of changes, faults or disturbances of 
the equipment is analysed. The search strategy will be a 
proceduralized iteration among the description of the plant 
properties as represented by the abstraction hierarchy. 
In addition to the strategy, the causal structure of the plant 
in which the search is performed, must be documented in a 
stringent way. This not only implies an identification of the 
plant documentation which is taken as representative, such as P 
and I diagram, process descriptions, and formal operating 
procedures, but also that the consistency of the information 
related to the various levels of the abstraction hierarchy must 
be documented. For this purpose, application of the mass/energy 
flow graph representation of the total system as suggested by 
Lind (1982a, 1982b) seems to be promising. (See also Rasmussen 
& Lind, 1981, 1982). 
In this basic analysis is included only those human activities 
which are formalised in written work instructions and for which 
a work analysis as described below is performed. This means 
that manual protective functions not specified in the formal 
instructions are not given credit and erroneous human acts not 
related to those specified activities are not included. 
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Fig. 5. Multilevel flow model of a nuclear power plant specify-
ing goals and functions. From Rasmussen & Lind, 1982. 
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plant. From Lind, 1982a. 
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WORK ANALYSIS 
In the basic PRA is included a work analysis covering the reli-
ability and the immediate risk from human errors during 
performance of formally instructed activities. A set of cri-
teria must be established to guide the decision as to whether a 
given task design is acceptable for formal analysis and it is 
assumed that identification of necessary human activities not 
corresponding to such criteria will lead to modification of the 
system design. In our view, with the present state of the art, 
only scheduled, familiar tasks are considered to be accessible 
to formal analysis. Fig. 7 gives an overview of the content of 
a work analysis and its relationships to the risk analysis. 
The phases of work analysis which are shown in Appendix 1 are 
tentatively procedural i zed for evaluation by application in 
trial analyses of event reports and other actual case stories. 
AUGMENTATION OF BASIC PRA BY ANALYSIS 
OF LESS STRUCTURED HUMAN INTERFERENCE 
As a supplement to the basic PRA as documented by CCCs, an 
analysis is performed of the possible modifications of the 
content of the CCCs due to errors during human activities in 
general. The aim is an explicit documentation of the search 
strategy and the field of search for such analysis so as to 
create the basis for systematic risk management through feed-
back from event report analysis. 
Due to human acts the content of the CCCs can be modified in 
the following ways: 
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Fig. 7. Illustrates the difference between work analysis: with 
starting point in normal work sequences and seeking for the ef-
fects of errors; and risk analysis: with starting point in a 
critical event seeking for its possible causes among technical 
failures and human activities and errors. 
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Increase of frequency of chains of events 
Human errors and acts may increase the probability or frequency 
of events already contained in the basic cause-consequence-
-charts. For each of the CCC-decision boxes, therefore, it is 
judged whether human errors will be significant contributors. 
For sensitive decision boxes, for instance those found in 
recovery paths related to protective functions, a work analysis 
is performed of topographically and functionally "close" acti-
vities. 
Change of structure in the CCCs 
One type of critical human act will be to break a recovery path 
related to a safety function. Interference due to unreliability 
of instructed human safety functions is covered by the work 
analysis included in the basic PRA. Interference in a recovery 
path due to decision errors and undue interaction during emer-
gency situations requires an independent systematic analysis. 
In particular, a formal analysis must be able to identify 
possible decision errors which may provoke systematic inter-
actions due to the existence of instructions for activities 
aiming at different purposes for the same system. An unaccept-
able act can be the result of a mistake caused by similiarities 
between the actual situation and another task context of which 
the act is a natural part. This similiarity may be found at any 
level of the abstraction hierarchy of figure 4; i.e., the 
mistake may be caused by a similiarity in terms of location or 
appearance of equipment, of the physical function, of the 
purpose of the systems in overall plant goals or in terms of 
action sequences. A way to specify the kinds of systematic 
interference ("systems interaction") caused by the existing 
many-to-many mappings among purposes, functions and equipment, 
which are taken into account in an analysis, can be to base the 
analysis on a proceduralized search in a consistent and 
documented description of plant properties at the various 
levels of the abstraction hierarchy. 
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Another way in which the structure of a CCC can be changed by 
human interference is by introduction of causal coupling be-
tween events which are otherwise independent, in particular 
between events initiating a transient and events leading to 
interruption of a recovery path. The extent to which such coup-
lings can be identified by formalised strategies looking for 
events, functions and equipment in critical parts of the CCC 
must be examined. Such strategies may be based on the topogra-
phical or functional closeness of equipment or psychological 
similarities of acts, leading to errors of intention or action. 
Identification of critical activities for which the potential 
for a decision error should be analysed or a work analysis 
performed, must be studied in relation to the abstraction 
hierarchy in order to develop formal morphological search 
strategies. Again, such a strategy will be a procedural ised 
search throngh a data-base representing the properties of the 
plant at the various levels of abstraction to identify system-
atic relations between an unacceptable act - for instance to 
interrupt a safety system - and intentions or acts related to 
other goals, systems or operating modes, which may systemati-
cally lead to the unacceptable act through connections in the 
many-to-many mapping between equipment, functions, and pur-
poses. 
The practical feasibility of such an approach should be judged 
with the present evolution of computer supported design data 
bases in mind. 
A fundamental weakness of the search strategies considered so 
far is that multiple errors are included only to a limited 
degree. In addition, the analysis of complex situations, for 
instance during major overhauls and refuelling periods, is 
difficult to include due to their less structured character. 
For this reason attempts are also underway to develop morpho-
logical strategies which look directly for risky patterns of 
faults and disturbances as a supplement to the previous 
strategies which consider the chain of events by means of 
causal forward- or backtracking. 
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A morphological method involving a birds-eye-view search for 
accidental patterns has previously been discussed briefly 
(Rasmussen, 1979o), in terms of sneak-path analysis. A heuris-
tic strategy to identify such situations resembles a design 
algorithm: First, the potential for accidents such as high 
energy accumulations, toxic material concentrations etc. are 
identified together with potential targets for accidental 
release such as people, environment etc. Then possible acci-
dents are designed; i.e., the technical (mal)-functions and 
human actions which are necessary to form the route from source 
to target are determined. Finally, it is determined how changes 
in the normal system together with coincident normal and 
abnormal human activities will coincide with the designed 
accident pattern. Such accidents are sometimes due to "sneak 
paths" which are formed by minor mishaps or malfunctions in 
simultaneous human activities which only become risky in case 
of very specific combinations and timing. 
The close relation to design procedures invites immediately an 
attempt to base a formalization on the abstraction hierarchy of 
Figure 4. The procedure involves a top-down search through the 
levels of the hierarchy but, unlike the search in the basic 
PRA, the normal functional links among the elements are not 
used to structure the search. Instead, the plant is considered 
as a collection of elements or parts at the various levels 
which can be connected to form accidental chains in the process 
of design for an accident. Subsequently, the changes in the 
normal structure needed to release the accident are identified 
in order to judge its probability. Again, judgement of the 
feasibility of such an approach must be done with the recent 
developments within data basis for computer aided design in 
mind. 
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CONCLUSION 
The present report is an interia report presenting the basic 
structure of an approach to an integration of a formal, 
probabilistic risk analysis and the practical administration of 
preconditions of mn analysis, this integration being necessary 
if the risk calculated is to have any relation to the risk 
imposed by the actual, operating plant. The ai-a of the report 
is to S9rv as a discussion which can serv« to coordinate the 
impact on PRA fro* various studies on systea Modelling, huaan 
perfonaance analysis and risk analysis in the group at Ris« and 
in the joint Scandinavian NKA/LIT study. The work has been 
funded partly by the Nordic Board of Ministers. 
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APPENDIX 1 
PROCEDURE FOR WORK ANALYSIS 
Analysis of reliability and immediate risk from performance in 
a familiar, well trained task which is part of a planned work 
schedule. This means: the goal or target of the activity is 
generally accepted; the cues to start of the task are known 
and, therefore, no errors of intention are considered. 
A. ANALYSIS OF TASK SEQUENCE 
Use instructions and manuals as well as interviews and 
observations. 
A.l. Define a sequence of phases or subtasks which is 
determined by functional requirements of the system 
and which cannot be modified without interrupting the 
task. 
A.2. Define the necessary acts of the different alterna-
tive, functionally acceptable action sequences for 
each subtask, (i.e., also possible short-cuts, tricks 
of the trade, which lead to an acceptable result.) 
B. ANALYSIS OF TASK RELIABILITY 
B.l. Define acceptance criteria for task product. (Cri-
teria for task process are related to analysis of 
risk). 
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B.2. Define error recovery points; i.e., define points in 
the sequence in which previously committed errors 
will be immediately observable - either directly or 
by breaking task sequence, making action difficult. 
(Such recovery points may correspond to links between 
subtasks of A.l.). 
B.3. Define those acts or action sequences for which the 
influence on task product is not covered by error 
detection and recovery; i.e., errors will not be 
observable and reversible. 
B.4. For these acts, identify the human error modes which 
will lead to uncorrected, unacceptable task product. 
This error-mode-and-effect analysis can be performed 
by postulating errors in terms of external acts 
(Taylor, 1982) or internal error mechanisms, (Rasmus-
sen, 1982). The first is the simplest; however, if 
risk analysis is to be made, the latter is prefer-
able. See figure 8. 
B.5. Evaluate conditions for error detection and correc-
tion at the states found in B.2. Define error modes 
which will cause unsuccessful error recovery. 
B.6. Apply human error rate estimates to evaluate total 
task reliability, considering errors and modes found 
in B.4. and B.5. 
B.7. Judge whether the reliability of the error recovery 
at the recovery points of B.2. is in fact sufficient-
ly high to ignore errors in the preceding sequence. 
If not, repeat B.3. for these sequences. 
C. ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE RISK 
C.l. Define the topographically nearest as well as the 
structurally and functionally connected systems which 
can be affected by erroneous human acts. 
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EXTERNAL CAUSES IR1EMAL E M M 
HECHAIISPS 
EXTERNAL 
Requirement 
for mental 
functions 
IRTEIUIAL RENTAL 
FUSCTIOtfS FAILED 
TAT* 
Specified 
•ction se-
quence 
EXTERML WOE OF 
ACTIO! EMORS 
HUNAN ERROR MECHANISM ANALYSIS HUMAN ACTION ERROR MODE ANALYSIS 
Based on model of man, task 
and system function. 
Search through generic human 
error mechanisms. 
Relates effect of each error 
to success of task and er-
roneous chains of event. 
Includes human coupling of 
chains of events. 
Includes some types of "er-
rors of intention". 
- Based on model of task and 
system function. 
- Search through generic action 
error modes. 
- Relates effect of individual 
errors to success of task and 
chains of event in system. 
- Coupling of chains of event 
due to human traits not cover-
ed. 
- Errors of intention not cover-
ed. 
Fig. 8. The figure illustrates how error-mode-and-effect can 
start by postulating error modes at different links in the causal 
chain of events involving human activity. 
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C.2. Define the set of error modes which should be used in 
a error-mode-and-effect analysis. Use modes in terms 
of internal error mechanisms in order to be able to 
perform C.5. 
C.3. Apply this set of postulated errors for each of the 
steps in the applicable task sequences of A.2. 
C.4. For each action and error mode, identify possible 
unaccep able effects on the system worked on, as well 
as those identified in C.l. 
C.5. Evaluate the significance of the possible simul-
taneous presence of an erroneous act and an unaccept-
able task product, i.e., a possible, systematic 
coupling between two abnormal chains of events. 
C.6. Judge potential for error detection and recovery for 
each relevant error mode from C.4. 
C.7. Categorize unacceptable effects found by C.4. and 
C.5. in relation to the overall risk analysis as 
given in the CCC. 
C.8. Apply human error estimates for the significant 
contributors in C.4. and C.5. 
D. ANALYSIS OF TASK DISTURBANCES 
Task disturbances may lead the performer to re-evaluate 
the task conditions. This may result in decisions which, 
if erroneous, may give human "errors of intention". 
D.l. Evaluate sources of disturbances. Define the cate-
gories to be analysed in an explicit way. Formulate 
assumptions in order to facilitate "risk management" 
of those not included in the analysis. 
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Examples of typical sources of disturbances: 
- personnel/work planning and scheduling 
- tools/equipment; materials, spareparts 
- latent, faulty conditions in system worked on. 
D.2. Identify for each of the task steps not covered by 
error recovery and for the error recovery path, the 
possible lack/degradation of planning/tools/material-
/information which will affect task conditions. 
D.3. Identify the normal, typical, easy alternative re-
placements or improvisations of the particular pro-
fession and work setting. 
D.4. For the improvised task sequences identified in D.3., 
repeat analysis under A., B., and C. If effects are 
unacceptable and conditions too unstructured for 
analysis, modify system or specify risk management. 
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Abstract 
For r i s k management, the r e s u l t s o f a prob-
a b i l i s t i c r i s k a n a l y s i s (PRA) as we l l as the 
under ly ing assumptions can be used as r e f e r e n c e s 
i n a c l o s e d - l o o p r i s k c o n t r o l ; and the ana lyses 
o f opera t iona l e x p e r i e n c e s as a means of f eed -
back. In t h i s c o n t e x t , the need for e x p l i c i t 
d e f i n i t i o n and documentation of the PRA cover-
a g e , inc lud ing the search s t r a t e g i e s a p p l i e d , i s 
d i s c u s s e d and a i d s are proposed such as p lant 
d e s c r i p t i o n in terms of a formal a b s t r a c t i o n 
h ierarchy and use o f cause -consequence-chart s 
f o r the documentation o f not on ly the r e s u l t s of 
PRA but a l s o of i t s coverage . Typical human r i s k 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s are descr ibed on the b a s i s of 
genera l p lant d e s i g n f e a t u r e s r e l e v a n t for r i sk 
and a c c i d e n t a n a l y s i s . 
With t h i s background, search s t r a t e g i e s for 
human r i s k c o n t r i b u t i o n s are t r e a t e d : Under the 
d e s i g n a t i o n "work a n a l y s i s " , procedures for the 
a n a l y s i s of f a m i l i a r , we l l t r a i n e d , planned 
t a s k s are proposed. S t r a t e g i e s for i d e n t i f y i n g 
human r i s k c o n t r i b u t i o n s o u t s i d e t h i s category 
are o u t l i n e d . 
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